Abstract. Ong-Schnorr identification and signatures are variants of thc Fiat-Shamir scheme with short and fast comniuIiication and signa1,ilres. This scheme uses secret, keys that arc 2'-roots modulo A T of the public keys, whereas Fiat-Sharnir uses square roots modulo N . Security for particular cases has recently been proved by Micali [M94] and Shoup [ShYG].
Introduction and Summary
Fiat and Shsmir [FS86] proposed a practical idtmtitication arid signature schcmc that is based on a zeroknowlcdge protoc~il of Gold\vasser, Micali arid Rackoff [GMR89] for proving quadratic residuosit,y. Thc C;Q-protoc:ol of Guillou and Quisquater [GQ88] and Ong-Schnorr idcntification and signatures [OS90] a,rc variants of the Fiat-Sharriir scheme which provide shorter communication and signatures than the Fiat-Shamir schcme. T h e Ong-Schnorr scheme is a direct generalization of thc Fiat-Shaniir scheme, whcre square roots modulo N are replaced by 2'-roots. This compact variant of the Fiat-Sharnir scheme is as fast, in the number of modular multiplications, as the original scheme. Until recently it was only kiiawri that Ong-S(:hnorr identification is secure provided that particular 2'-roots modulo N are hard to compute [OS90] . Recently there has been surprising progress for the cast of Blurn intcge7:s N , i.e. N = p y with primes p , q that are wngruerit 3 mod 4.
Previous results. Micali [M94] proves tliiit, Ong-Schnorr signatures are secure if t,hc secret key is a. 2'-root of 4, 2 is a, quadratic: non-residue modulo N arid N is difficiilt to factor. In the case considered by Micali, the secret key, the 2'-root 144 of 4, reveals the prime factors of N . Tliercfore, tlistiiict users must have different rrioduli N , and N ninst, he part of thc sccret key rather than a public pxramet(:r as in tlic Fiat-Sharriir scheme anti its mteiision by Ong-Sclinorr. M i d i assumes that the hash function used for signatures acts as a raridom oracle.
Shoup [ShgG] proves that Ong-Schiiorr identification with Bluni int*egers A' is secure against active adversaries iiriless N is easy t,o fitctor. Shoup transforrns, less efficiently than for t h r Fiat-Shaniir scfirme, active impcrso~iation attacks into the factoriz;ttiori of N . Shoup' s retiiict,ion is not cnt,irely construc:tive, :is it) requires a priori knowledge on the adversary's probability of success.
Our results. We prove thal Ong-Schnorr identification is secure for arbitrary moduli N = py. This extends and improves the results of Shoup in various wags. It sheds iiew light on the prime factors p and (I of the rnoclulus N . The cfficiericy of our rcdiict,ioIi from factoring N = T J~ l o inipcrsonat,ion attacks depends 011 t,he rnaxinial 2-powt\r 2"' that divides cithcr p --1 or q --1. We distinguish activc and of passive attacks. In a n (JM?ZW nttuck the advcmary poscs, before the inipersoiiation attempt, as verifier. in i~ scqiicnc~r of executions of the ID-protocol arid asks qiicst,ions of his choice iising t,hci legit,iiiiatr! im'r as oracle. In a. ~U S S Z~I C inzpcrsor~utiar~ ultack thc adversary is givcii tho piiblic key: but he caniiot PVCII listen in t o cxwiitioris of the ID-protoc:ol.
The casts t,liat 711 2 t , respectivcly 711, < 1 , are quite different. For na 2 1 we transform active irripersonn.tion att,acks into a. fa.c:torizatiori of N , as etficiciitly as for Fiat-Shanrir ID. 'This factoring mtt~lrod orily requires that the advcrsary's success ra,tc: is twice the succcss rat,e for guessing the exam posed by t,he verifier.
Moduli N with 711 2 t provide optimal sccurity against act,ive/passive impersoriatioii attacks provitled that, N is tlifficult t,o factor.
For the ciLsc 111 < t , wc transform p a 7~e irriprrsonation a.ttacks into tli? factorization of N , iLs cffic:icntly ;LS for Fi Shamir 11). The factoring ruethoti uses public keys that, ar(> generate(1 together with ;L pseudo-key w h k h is indrpmdcnt, of t,hr: sc:c:ret key. Having only a. pst:utlo-key c:oniplicates for srriall 711 the reduction from factoring to active iiripersoiiation attacks. It becomes difficult to siniulatc the ID-protoc:ol, which is n a.ry to provide thc information needed by the adversary for a n artive irripersc,iia.t,ioir ii.t,t,a.(:k. This leads to a trade-off'f which we t1esc:rihc: iri Theorem 8: cithcr there is an additional tirne factor 2'"'' for factoring N or the minimal required success rate of the active ac1vcrs;tr.y increases by thr factor 2 t -r 7 1 , Previous protocols. l'hc original F'ist-Sharnir scheme is the case t = 1 of the Ong-Schnorr protocol, repeated several t,imes. While Fiat-Shaniir ID reqiiirrs t sequential rounds for a security level Z k t , the Ong-SchIiorr scheme compacts 1 rounds of the Fiat-Sharnir scheme into a single round. Fiat-Shamir ID is sccurc against passive and active atttacks unless N can easily be factored. Fiat-Shamir signatures are secure in the random oracle rnodel [FSSS] , [FFS88] . Attacks with a sii(:ccss rate that is a t 1ea.st twice t h r probability of guessing the exam e , can be transformed into the factorization of N .
Security
The GQ-protocol [GQ88] is the case of single corriponent keys, where 2'-powers x = T~' are replaced by wpowcrs IL' = T" for an arbitrary inleger u less than N . The GQ-protocol consists of a single round with a large exam e. This greatly reduces the length of transmission and of signatures compared to the Fiat-Shamir schemc, at the cxpeiise of a. slightly increased work load.
Notation. Let, the fraudulent prover A be an interactive, probabilistic Tiiring machine that is given the fixed iiiput,s k , t , N ( k , t arc sometimes omitted). Let RA be the sequence of coin tosses of A. Define 
S2"
can be independent of the 2'-roots s,i of v j . Otherwise, the factorization {gcd(Y f S,N)} = {p, q} would hold at least with probability i. Wc use the striicturc of the prime factors p , q of N . 
Lemma 2 is obvious. Then, it checks whet,hcr
{@(p * Z"+'
For thri analysis we itssume w. A basic difficulty with tlw abovc l a c t d n g algorithm is that it requires P < r r~, while the coristructiori only guarantees P < t . If P 2 m. it can ha.ppcn that "-fraction of successes so that e = e mod 2" 1 always holds.
Passive impersonation attacks for m <, t
For m < t we give another reduction from factoring to impersonation. The factoring algorithm generates a random public key v together with a pseudo-key s which enables to transform successful attacks of a passive adversary A into the factorization of TV. shows that tlie algorithm factorizes at, least, with probability 1/2.
T h e above proof rst,al)lishes sec:iirit,y of public: keys 7) that are generated wit,liout a corresponding secret key s . We h a w gericrated 'u 1roni a random pseudo-keg . S so that 1/?13 = 3;"' holds for ,j = 1 , . . . k . Wc cannot genemte first a secret key s to produce a pseudo-key .i by sqiiariiig t,he c:orriporient,s of s , as the component>s 2, arc, with probability 3/4, quadratic non-rcsiducs. If wc have w and .T together with i, we can easily factor N . We (:an assume that, (y2' n.j v;', Ad) = ( r ) , M I ) holds for some a 5 J , since otherwise c = h,(y2' n, ti-;' , Ad) holds with probahilitg 2--kL. If the adversary produces x; := y2' n, ' u.;' for some preselected P and y, the oracle returns the preselected e with probability 2 ' l . Each oracle query contributes a t most 2 p k L to the succcss rate S A , ,~, .
Hence at least with probability S A , ,~ -f 2 p k t , the attacker At is able to produce two distinct, pairs ( e , g ) and (e,y) so that e # e . i
The factoring algorithm picks randorii sj E J~ Z :
, ,
Factoring algorithm
Pick random s 3 ER Z*,, set, l/o.] 1-.zf for ,I = 1 , . . . X: imd 71. := 0
Pick a random sctquence of coin tosses R A for -4,.
For the message signature pairs reyuestcd by Adf providc random signaturt's.
Ixt, the adversary query the 11,-oraclc ;tt)oiit ( x z , M , ) for i 1 1, . . . , f.
v:' = 5 , for some z (in this case we call t,he pair ( R A , e ) sirccrssful with .rt) then fix RA, ' 1, x,, A4,, e , y, set u := 4uf and go t,o step 4. Otherwise, increase u by 1 and go back to step 2 undoing A j ' s computation.
(sec:ond signing attcmpt) Simulate the ;adversary A f with 1 1 , RA.
Let the oracle answer the first i -1 queries thc same way as in step 3.
Let it aiiswer the other qiieries statistically iritiepeiidcnt from previous oracle outpnts. (111 particular, t,he o r a c k is rcpcat,edly queried about the Sketch of the analysis. On the ;tvc\rage it, takes l/Sj,,,, many passes of steps 2 the siibscquent step 4 fabricatcs a second signature (c,fj) with the saine ,ri at, least, with probability a ( l~ 2.7 ').
For this we note: wit,li probability at 1 w s t i, s t t p 3 proljes a l leas1 'u 2 TSA,,~, In case that, 'nL < t , the factoring algorithrn generates, as in the proof of Thcorern 5, the public key from a randora pseiido-key S and factorizes N acc:ortfirig to Theorem 5 . N. The efficiency of the rixiuctioii depmds in a n interesting way on the par;mcter 771. Whilo the reduction is quite PfIicierit. for 7n, close to t , it is less efficierit.
for Blum integers, whcrc m = 1. This dcficiency of Bliim integers was not apparent from Shoup's proof. Shoup In view of Theorem 7, moduli N with m > t provide optimal security against active impersonation attacks provided that A T is difficult to factor. This raises the question on how the difficulty of factoring a random integer N depends on the parameter m. We are not aware of a factoring algorithm that makes a relevant difference for small values of m, say for m < 10, the relevant case for Ong-Schnorr ID.
The previous reductions cannot be easily extended to the case of active adversaries if m, < t. At best, we can combine Lemma 4 with the use of pseudo-keys as in Theorem 5. The factoring method of Theorem 3 requires i < m which in This theorern c:ont,ains thc result of Shoup [Sh96] that active impersonation attacks can be transformed in polynomial time into thc factorization of a Blum inleger rriodulus AT. If the success rate S . Z , ,~ is at least l/(log(N))' for somc constant c > 0 and if we have a corresponding a priori lower bound for SA',", we apply Theorem 8 with t h r iriaxiinal 7ii. satisfying 2-kt+k(7'1-TrL)+2 < '~ 5'-l t f , V '
With this m, the time factor 2 k ( L -~r ' t ) is polynomiirlly bounded, and togetskier with a polynomial time adversary A f , the factoring algoritliin becomes polynomial time. A priori knowledge of A ' s success rate is not rcquired sirice we can simply guess the optimal in,, which increases t,he fitctoring time by the small f ac. .tj or m , . If c # e' mod 2t-'7' go t)ac:l< to step 2. I uricioirig tlie computation of ilf.
Proof
Otherwise sct :y := T n .S'"" '"" ( A n easy calculatiori shorn that YZ=" ---Z,,, holds for some in,, then we have in,, < i , otherwise terrninate ( as the proposed factoring mcthod succceds using Y,,,, Z,,, with probability 4 ).
Continue the repetitions of the entire algorithm using idependent coin flips and continue to decrease i until the algorithm either terminates in Case I or enters Case I1 with i = 1. In the latter case the proposed factoring method succeeds iising Y,,,, Z,,, with probability f , in particular {gcd(Y,,, k Z,,,, N ) } = { p , q} holds with probability f.
With the supplemental steps the algorithm factorizes N with probability 4. The supplemental steps increase the time bound for factoring by a factor O(e). The correctness proof of the amended factoring method uses the following observation We see from Y2' = Z2"' mod N that Z 2 ' / Y is a 2t-root of 1 mod N. This root is not necessarily uniformly distributed over all 2t-roots of 1 mod N. But it is uniformly distributed within certain cosets. All subsequent factoring algorithms in the paper have to be amended in the same wa.y.
